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Abstract 
Type of thesis: Degree Project in Business Administration for Master of Science in 
Business and Economics, 30.0 credits 
University: University of Gothenburg, School of Economics, Business and Law. 
Semester: Spring 2014 
Authors: Caroline Karlsson and Ylva Molde 
Tutors: Mikael Cäker and Kristina Jonäll 
Titel:	  The existence of low balling on the Swedish audit market -A study of 
companies listed on the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm that voluntarily changed audit 
firm 2002-2010 
Background and Problem: The lack of auditor independence is discussed being one 
of the reasons to scandals such as Enron and HQ. A pricing strategy that has been 
debated impairing auditor independence is low balling. To win a new client in a 
tender process, audit firms supposedly offer an audit fee below cost and then increase 
the fee the following years to recover the initial loss. The auditors’ future financial 
interest in the company due to the initial loss is by some believed to impair auditor 
independence, which makes low balling in Sweden a relevant phenomenon to study. 
Aim of study: This thesis aims to explain if low balling exists on the Swedish audit 
market and if the size of companies affects the results of low balling. 
Methodology: To achieve the purpose of this thesis, a statistical study was 
conducted. Data, found in annual reports of companies listed on NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm that changed audit firm 2002-2010, were analysed before and after the 
change. 107 companies that changed audit firm during the period were identified. 56 
of these fulfilled our inclusion criteria; 21 companies listed on Small cap, 21 on Mid 
cap, and 14 on Large cap.  
Analysis and conclusions: This study indicates that low balling exists on NASDAQ 
OMX Stockholm and in Sweden. The average initial audit fee discount was -17.53%, 
the second year after the change the discount was -4.57%, and the fees were almost 
back to normal levels by the third year, -0.61%, from the estimated normal audit fee. 
The results correlate with the most recent research on the subject done in Sweden and 
Germany. Our findings suggest that the extent of low balling varies between the caps; 
it exists among companies listed on Small and Large cap but not on Mid cap. 
Keywords: Low balling, audit pricing, initial fee discount, and audit firm switch. 
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Auditee: The client of the audit firm.  
Big 4: The four largest audit firms since 2002 in Sweden as well as worldwide; PwC, 
EY, KPMG and Deloitte. 
Big 6: The six largest accounting firms 1989-1998; Ernst & Young, Arthur Andersen, 
Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, Peat Marwick Mitchell and Price 
Waterhouse. 
Big 8: The eight largest audit firms before demises and mergers prior to 1989; Arthur 
Andersen, Arthur Young & Co., Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Whinney, Deloitte 
Haskins & Sells, Peat Marwick Mitchell, Price Waterhouse and Touche Ross. 
Companies: In this thesis a company is considered to be the client of the audit firm. 
Further, a company is considered to be the Group and thus not the Mother company.  
FAR: The professional institute for authorized public accountants, approved public 
accountants and other highly qualified professionals in the accountancy sector in 
Sweden.   
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1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to put the topic into context by providing the reader with 
background. This is followed by the problem discussion that culminates in a problem 
statement. The purpose of this thesis is presented in the end of this chapter.  
1.1 Background 
There have been many discussions about the role of auditors in a financial crisis. The 
crisis in 2008 forced the EU to come up with regulations to stabilise the EU economic 
and financial system. One major outcome of the discussion was to introduce 
mandatory audit firm rotation every 10 years, with the possibility of member states to 
choose additional 10 years (European Union 2013). This is believed to enhance audit 
quality and auditor independence (European Union 2013). Schatzberg & Sevcik 
(1994) defines auditor independence as “to be truthfully reporting an observed value 
for a client”. The lack of independence is assumed to be one of the reasons to 
scandals such as Enron in the US and HQ in Sweden (Grönboken 2010). 
Independence is hence a fundamental element in audit engagements and is therefore 
important to study. 
 
A factor that has been discussed impairing independence is low balling (Simon & 
Francis 1988; Schatzberg 1990). DeAngelo (1981) describes low balling as a pricing 
strategy that aims to win a client at a low price that does not cover the audit’s cost, 
and thereafter increases the audit fee the following years. By doing this, according to 
the author, the higher price aims to compensate for the lower audit fee paid by the 
auditee during the first couple of years. There have been arguments that discounting 
initial audit fee is a threat to auditor independence due to auditors’ future interest in 
the company (Simon & Francis 1988). To be able to recover the initial sunk costs, a 
long-term audit engagement is needed. Further, there is also a possibility that auditors 
impair their independence by the desire of not losing the client even if severe auditor-
client disagreements are present (Simon & Francis 1988). Schatzberg & Sevcik 
(1994) found evidence in their experiments that when low balling occurred, auditor 
independence was impaired since an observed value was less truthfully reported by 
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the auditors. DeAngelo (1981), however, opposes that low balling harms auditor 
independence and claims instead that it is a normal outcome of a competitive market. 
There are several studies regarding audit fees after a voluntary change of audit firm 
and results differ. For instance, Simon & Francis (1988) found that audit fees in the 
US declined the first three years after a voluntary change of audit firm. After four 
years, the audit fees were back to the normal level. The reason for this would be the 
discount given by auditing firms to win new clients (Simon & Francis 1988). In a 
different study on the Australian market, Francis (1984) found that no low balling 
existed, whereas in a recent study on the German market low balling was found 
(Krauß, Quosigk & Zülch 2014). In Sweden, Jonasson & Tungel (2012) found that 
low balling exists in Sweden. 
 
1.2 Problem discussion 
In prior research, studies have revealed many different factors that drive the audit fee 
(Hay et al 2006). The main attribute of the client that affects the price of audit is the 
size of auditee. This is possible to measure in two ways, by the Balance sheet 
component Total Assets or by the Income statement component Company Turnover 
(Hay et al 2006; Pong & Whittington 1994). Hay et al (2006) claim in a meta-analysis 
of 25 years of research that approximately three quarters of previous research of audit 
fees use Total Assets to measure the auditee size and remaining studies used 
Company Turnover. 
 
Total Assets, however, is somewhat misleading since a large proportion of this could 
be an account where the audit fee does not correlate well with the size of that account. 
For example, the same amount of work will be required on Goodwill and Cash and 
Cash Equivalent independent of their size since a larger proportion of these accounts 
not necessarily require more audit. There is also a possibility that similar companies 
value assets differently, which has a direct effect on the size of Total Assets. The 
auditee could also use “Off balance sheet” financing as leasing, and Total Assets 
might therefore be misleading (Chan, Ezzamel & Gwilliam 1993). Company 
Turnover, on the other hand, could be a better variable to determine the size of auditee 
since no disruptive accounts occur. In the tender process, professional auditors 
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commonly use the ratio of Audit Fee and Company Turnover as a first approximation 
of the audit fee, since Company Turnover is an estimate of workload that is needed in 
audit (Oxera 2006). 
 
Jonasson & Tungel (2012) maintained that low balling exists on the Swedish audit 
market by the majority of companies listed on the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm that 
voluntarily changed audit firm. However, ratios of Audit Fee and Total Assets 
calculated for each year around the change were used to determine if low balling 
existed. The above discussion shows that there could be a better way to measure 
auditee size and it is therefore uncertain if low balling actually exists on the Swedish 
audit market and consequently further studies on this are needed. 
 
Arguments have been made that there is more room for a discount in a larger 
company due to the importance of large clients to maintain status as well as the major 
audit fees earned from these clients (Carson et al 2012). Earlier research does not 
mention regarding if low balling differs between small, medium or large companies. 
In Sweden, for example, Volvo is listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm Large cap 
with almost 300,000 millions in sales (VOLVO 2012), whereas Odd Molly listed on 
Small cap had sales of 228 millions the same year (Odd Molly International 2012). 
More research on this area is needed to show not only if low balling exists, but also if 
it varies between companies of different size. 
 
1.3 Problem statement 
Does low balling exist on the Swedish audit market and does the company size affect 
the extent of low balling? 
 
1.4 Purpose 
The aim of this thesis is to explain if low balling exists on the Swedish audit market 
and if the company size affects the results of low balling. 
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2. Frame of references 
This section aims at a deeper understanding of the topic. Firstly, a wider description 
of the subject is outlined, then the survey of relevant previous research follows as it is 
used to analyse the empirics later in the thesis.  
2.1 Auditing  
Companies that are listed on a regulated market are required to have an auditor or an 
audit firm that audit their financial statements. The audit should be conducted in 
accordance with audit standards and regulations set by a government body (ABL 
2005:551).  
 
Audit firms and their auditors have a legal liability towards stakeholders (Lee & Gu 
1998). To be able to make an accurate investment decision, financial statements are 
needed, and a qualitative and independent audit is hence demanded for insurance that 
the information presented reflects the financial position of the company (Oxera 2006; 
ABL 2005:551). 
 
2.2 The tender process 
The tender process is an expensive and time-consuming process for auditees as well 
as for audit firms. Consequently, only audit firms that are able to engage in the audit 
commitment are invited to take part in the tender process (FAR 2005). To be able to 
audit large global clients, a grand international network is needed as well as expertise 
and resources (Carson et al 2012; Oxera 2006). Each firm has to estimate an expected 
effort for the audit and state an estimated price. A fixed price of audit is forbidden, 
since conditions under which the audit is performed could change (FAR 2005). 
 
There has been mixed evidence regarding how companies choose audit firm. A study 
ordered by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Financial Reporting Council 
in the UK, called the Oxera study (2006), stated that audit committees, in general, 
consider quality over price when choosing audit firm. Johnson & Lys (1990), on the 
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other hand, claim that clients choose audit firms that have the possibility to deliver 
audit at the lowest price.  
 
2.3 Initial costs 
There are many different start-up costs that occur for the audit firm. Start-up costs 
including checking the client’s initial balance sheets figures and the loss of specific 
assets as mutual trust and familiarity are two main initial costs of audit (Arruñada & 
Paz-Ares 1997). A survey made by Ridyard & De Bolle (1992) showed that it took 
the auditor over a year to gain understanding of the auditee if the auditor had previous 
experience in the industry where the auditee performed and over two years in an 
industry where the auditor had no previous experience. Hence, with the above 
discussion, the costs of audit should realistically be higher the year of the switch. 
 
2.4 Determinants of audit fees 
There are many different factors that are considered to affect the price of audit such as 
the size, complexity, the number of subsidiaries, and the risk of the auditee (Simunic 
1980). A factor that is highly significant and most important for setting the level of 
audit fees, according to previous research, is the size of the auditee (Hay et al 2006). 
The size of the auditee is possible to measure by Total Assets or Company Turnover 
(Hay et al 2006; Pong & Whittington 1994). Total Assets have been the most 
common figure used to measure auditee size in previous research of audit fee 
determinants and low balling (Hay et al 2006; Simon & Francis 1988; Jonasson & 
Tungel 2012), whereas Company Turnover is the figure which audit firms use as a 
first approximation of audit fees (Oxera 2006). 
 
There are positive as well as negative aspects of both measurements. Total Assets 
include components that are risky from the audit point of view as inventories and 
receivables, which is a positive aspect (Simunic 1980). However, Total Assets could 
vary between otherwise comparable companies due to different accounting policies or 
different age profile of assets (Chan, Ezzamel & Gwilliam 1993). As mentioned 
earlier, Total Assets could include large proportions of misleading accounts as 
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Goodwill and Cash and Cash Equivalent do not necessarily require more audit. 
Company Turnover excludes problems such as financial structure and different 
accounting policies, but problems could still be present due to different turnover 
definitions in different industries (Chan, Ezzamel & Gwilliam 1993). 
 
Another factor that affects the price of audit is accounting and audit regulations. The 
Oxera study (2006) stated that an increase of accounting and audit regulations could 
lead to an increase in audit fees. Companies expect their auditors to provide 
information about new accounting regulations; a larger number of work hours for 
auditors are thus needed which drives the audit fee (Oxera 2006).   
 
2.4.1 NASDAQ OMX Stockholm 
As previously mentioned, the size of the company is the most important factor that 
drives the price of audit (Hay et al 2006). Carson et al (2012) argue that large 
corporations are important clients due to the major audit fees and status, which these 
clients bring to the audit firm. Therefore, the possibility of larger audit fee discounts 
increase. NASDAQ OMX Stockholm is divided into three different segments 
depending on the size of the company: Large cap, Mid cap and Small cap. Companies 
listed on Large cap have a market value of more than one billion euros, Mid cap 
between 150 millions and one billion euros, whereas companies listed on Small cap 
have a market value of less than one billion euros (Swedbank 2014). 2012-12-31, 55 
companies were listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm Large cap, 62 on Mid cap and 
104 on Small cap (Retriever 2014).  
 
2.5 Low balling  
DeAngelo (1981) describes low balling as a pricing strategy when auditors aim at 
becoming the incumbent auditor to be able to earn extra profits on future audits 
during audit tenure. The incumbent auditor has cost advantages over competitors due 
to start-up costs and transaction costs that occur for the client when companies switch 
auditors. To be able to earn these quasi-rents under subsequent years, audit firms are 
supposedly willing to lower the initial audit fee. Hence, two requirements need to be 
met. Firstly, the audit firm has to accept a loss the year of the switch by offering a fee 
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lower than the costs of audit engagement. Secondly, the audit fee under the following 
years needs to cover for the initial loss as well as profit from the audit engagement 
(DeAngelo 1981). 
 
Low balling has been discussed impairing auditor independence (Simon & Francis 
1988; Schatzberg 1990; Schatzberg & Sevcik 1994). The Cohen Report (1978), 
written by the Commission of Auditors’ Responsibilities in the US, discussed possible 
problems with low balling due to its signal of compliance to managers. Further, the 
authors of the report argue that a threat to independence might be present when a deep 
initial audit fee discount occurs since it creates a receivable. Consequently, it creates a 
need for the audit firm to audit a financial success company to recover the initial loss 
of the audit firm in the following years (The Cohen Report 1978). Opposite 
arguments have been made by Lee & Gu (1998) who argue that low balling instead 
enhances auditor independence. Lee & Gu (1998) conclude that initial audit fee 
discounts are less costly than an ineffective market and reflects the competition over 
clients. DeAngelo (1981) claims that low balling is a normal outcome of a 
competitive market and thus not affecting auditor independence. Chan (1999) argues 
that an industry specialisation of a new audit firm leads to lower audit fees due to 
expertise and agrees with DeAngelo (1981) that low balling is a normal outcome of a 
competitive market.  
 
DeAngelo (1981) expects low balling in settings regardless of publicly disclosed audit 
fees, whereas Dye (1991) predicts that low balling will only occur in settings where 
audit fee figures are not publicly available, and the independence issue could 
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2.5.1 Earlier studies on low balling internationally 
There have been plenty of studies examining if low balling exists in different markets 
with mixed results which is demonstrated in Table 1.  
Study Sample period Evidence of low balling 
Australia 
  Francis (1984) 1974-1978 No 
Germany 
  Krauß, Quosigk & Zülch (2014) 2005-2011 Yes 
Sweden 
  Jonasson & Tungel (2012) 2002-2009 Yes 
United Kingdom 
  Gregory & Collier (1996) 1991 Yes 
United States 
  Simunic (1980) 1977 No 
Palmrose (1986) 1980 No 
Baber, Brooks & Ricks (1987) 1980-1984 Yes 
Francis & Simon (1987) 1984-1985 Yes 
Simon & Francis (1988) 1979-1984 Yes 
Ettredge & Greenberg (1990) 1983-1987 Yes 
Table 1 illustrates previous research on low balling 
 
On the Australian audit market, Francis (1984) found no evidence of low balling. The 
sample of 26 companies was studied by comparing actual and predicted audit fees as 
well as the initial audit fee compared to the year before the change and the subsequent 
years. Low balling was not present in any of these two tests.  
 
Krauß, Quosigk & Zülch (2014) found on the German audit market that low balling 
exists. The study included 992 observations of large companies listed on the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange where audit fees were studied over a 4-year period. An average 
initial fee discount was found to be -13% and no discount effect was found the second 
year (Krauß, Quosigk & Zülch 2014). 
 
In the UK, Gregory & Collier (1996) found evidence of low balling among the Big 6 
audit firms when competing over clients. An initial fee reduction was found on an 
average of -22.4% and after four to five years the audit fee were at the same level as 
those companies did not change auditors (Gregory & Collier 1996).  
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Simunic (1980) and Palmrose (1986) found no evidence of the existence of initial fee 
discounts in the US. Simunic (1980) checked for initial fee discounts indirectly, by 
using an audit tenure variable in his audit fee model. A survey was mailed, since audit 
fees were not publicly disclosed during this time, with the response rate of 33% out of 
the 1207 companies. 397 respondents were then divided into companies with a Big 8 
or a non-Big 8 auditor. Palmrose (1986) studied price cutting directly and included 
361 companies that responded to the mailed questionnaire. The companies were 
domestic, public, and non-public companies. 
 
Other studies have shown that low balling exists in the US (Baber, Brooks & Ricks 
1987; Francis & Simon 1987; Simon & Francis 1988; Ettredge & Greenberg 1990). 
Francis & Simon (1987), however, researched initial fee discounts as a side issue of 
the paper which resulted in a small sample of 12 switches. Baber, Brooks & Ricks 
(1987) studied 37 auditor switches in North Carolina county governments. To detect a 
change of the initial audit fee, the initial fee was compared as a percentage of the 
mean audit fee in North Carolina county governments.  
 
Simon & Francis (1988) argue that low balling exists by presenting evidence of an 
initial audit fee discount the year the switch took place. A sample of 214 companies 
that switched auditors between 1979-1984 was researched, and the results were 
compared to 226 companies that did not change auditors during the same period, 
which served as an estimated normal audit fee. The average discount given was -24% 
the first year, -15% the second and third year, while the audit fees were back to 
normal levels by the fourth year (Simon & Francis 1988). These findings are similar 
to evidence found by Ettredge & Greenberg (1990) who concluded that an average 
discount of -25% existed the year a company switched audit firm. Ettredge & 
Greenberg (1990) used a sample of 389 companies in their study. They included 
factors as if the switch was to a Big 8 firm or not as well as the total numbers of firms 
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2.5.2 Earlier studies on low balling in Sweden 
Jonasson & Tungel (2012) studied if low balling exists in Sweden. They identified 57 
voluntarily changes of audit firm 2002-2009 on the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm that 
were relevant to the study. 27 of these switches occurred on Small cap, 19 on Mid 
cap, and 11 on Large cap. The authors include an auditee size in their study by 
calculating a ratio of Audit Fees and Total Assets. An average value was calculated 
two years before the change and two years after (𝑋). To avoid effects that could affect 
the study negatively by drastical changes of the company around the switch, the value 
two years before and after were also used (𝑋2). A relative value was calculated for 
both  𝑋 and 𝑋2 by dividing Audit Fee with Total Assets, which were found in the 
annual report of the auditee. A scarce majority of the companies in the study showed 
evidence of low balling when examining 𝑋 and 𝑋2 (Jonasson & Tungel 2012). 
 
For 𝑋, the average initial fee discount among companies listed on NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm was -27.06% followed by an increase of 14.55% when compared to the 
year of the change. For 𝑋2, the average initial fee discount was -30.16% followed by 
an increase of 13.67% when compared to the year of the change. By the third year, 𝑋2, the audit fees were 79.4% of the estimated normal fee (Jonasson & Tungel 2012). 
 
2.6 Research questions  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, there are many studies on low balling. These 
studies have used different variables but they all have included auditee size as the 
primary factor that affects the price (Hay et al 2006). This is possible to measure in 
two ways, by Total Assets or Company Turnover. However, research done on low 
balling has primarily used Total Assets (Simon & Francis 1988; Jonasson & Tungel 
2012), whereas professional auditors use Company Turnover as a first approximation 
of price (Oxera 2006). The most common definition used to explain low balling is the 
one of DeAngelo (1981), namely an initial fee discount is present as well as an 
increase in fee the following years to cover the initial loss as well as profit from the 
audit engagement. To be able to see if an initial fee discount is present, a comparison 
with the estimated normal fee and the disclosed fee in the year of the change of audit 
firm was done. Previous research has shown mixed results regarding the length of 
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discount effect (Simon & Francis 1988; Gregory & Collier 1996; Krauß, Quosigk & 
Zülch 2014). In our study, to be able to determine if low balling exists in Sweden, the 
data was collected from audit firm switches made by companies listed on NASDAQ 
OMX Stockholm. The data was gathered the year of the change as well as two years 
before and after the change, which enabled capturing the phenomenon of low balling. 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm is divided into three different caps depending on the 
market value of the company. As mentioned before, the size of the company is the 
primary factor that drives the price of audit (Hay et al 2006). This leads us to 
following research questions:  
 
1) Which measure of auditee size, Total assets or Company turnover, correlates better 
with the audit fee?  
2) Does the ratio of Audit Fee/Company Turnover decrease the year of the change of 
audit firm? 
3) Does the ratio of Audit Fee/Company Turnover increase the following two years 
after the change of audit firm? 
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3. Methodology 
This chapter describes how the study has been conducted and what methodological 
choices have been made to serve the purpose of this thesis. Later, the criteria of audit 
firm switches are presented followed by a paragraph on data analysis that aims to 
explain the methods of statistical analysis.  
3.1 Research design 
To serve the purpose of this thesis a statistical, quantitative study was conducted. This 
is the most suitable approach to answer our research questions. There exists a theory 
regarding the phenomena of low balling, and our study is deductive since we tested 
this theory on the Swedish audit market (Saunders et al 2009).  
 
The study was conducted and analysed after DeAngelo’s (1981) definition of low 
balling, who claims that two observed aspects of an audit engagement should be 
studied, the fees and the costs, to conclude if low balling occurs. Since the costs are 
not publicly available, the average audit fee from two years prior to the change is an 
estimation of a normal audit fee and was compared to the fees after the voluntary 
change. This made it possible to see if there was an initial fee discount the first year 
followed by an increase in fee the following years to conclude if low balling occurs.  
 
3.1.1 Credibility  
One can argue that a calculation of an average for only two years to estimate the 
normal audit fee is not enough. However, if more years were included in this average, 
more companies would be excluded due to the set of criteria of this study described in 
chapter 3.2. A larger population is more valued in this study to be able to explain if 
low balling exists than a possible limitation of a normal audit fee estimation.  
 
Audit fees are publicly disclosed in the annual report of each company. The cost of 
audit from the audit firm’s point of view is not available to the public, which makes 
possible only an indirect way of measuring low balling (Krauß, Quosigk & Zülch 
2014). For example, in a tender process, audit firms present the most suitable way the 
audit will be conducted. An audit with a substantive testing approach demands more 
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work hours and is hence more costly than an internal control approach. It is possible 
that the company has purchased a different service, for example a least-cost service 
with the only purpose to make it possible for the audit firm to sign the Auditor’s 
report. Therefore, a conclusion regarding low balling after a fee study could be 
difficult to make since this information is unavailable to the public. Consequently, 
there is a potential risk that a switch showing a “low balling effect” is in fact a 
different audit service purchased. Nevertheless, a study of audit fee changes over time 
is a common approach when researching low balling (Simon & Francis 1988; Krauß, 
Quosigk & Zülch 2014). 
 
Another factor that could affect the credibility of this study is changes in regulations. 
If law requires a more thorough audit, the price of audit will consequently be higher 
(Oxera 2006). An increase in fees after a voluntary change could hence be due to new 
regulations and not low balling.  
 
3.1.2 Literature 
To find primary research for this study, several databases such as Web Of Science, 
Scopus, Retriever and Business Source Premier have been used. The keywords that 
were most successful in the databases were: “low balling”, “price-cutting”, “initial 
fee”, discount, audit, fee, price, “audit change”, “audit pricing”, and “audit firm”. This 
enabled peer-reviewed articles relevant and important to this study to be found. Some 
articles that have been used are old, but to verify that they are still relevant, the 
numbers of their recent citing were looked into. Other sources of information that 
have been used are web pages of the European Union and FAR. Secondary literatures 
that have been used are annual reports (Blumberg, Cooper & Schindler 2008). The 
annual reports have been downloaded from the webpage of each company that are 
included in this study or from Retriever.   
 
3.2 Criteria to be included in this study  
Each company listed on the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm that switched auditors during 
2002-2010 are included in this study, to explain if low balling exists on the Swedish 
audit market. NASDAQ OMX Stockholm was chosen since this Stock Exchange is 
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the largest in Sweden and is divided into different segments depending on company 
size. Further, the study was based on the companies listed at the NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm 2012-12-31. Consequently, companies that were liquidated before this 
date are not included in this study. However, for a company not to be qualified a 
dropout a set of criteria needs to be fulfilled.  
 
The first criterion is that the company must be publicly listed during the whole period 
of study, that is two years before the change of audit firm as well as two years after; 
five years are thus studied for each switch. This criterion is set due to the increased 
costs of auditing which usually occurs when companies go public and is also a 
common criterion in previous studies (Francis & Simon 1988; Jonasson & Tungel 
2012).  
 
The second criterion is that the company must use the same accounting period during 
the years around the change. This criterion was set to enable comparisons between the 
years and establish that the periods are of the same length. The study also requires a 
new audit firm to have signed the Auditor’s report the year of the change to determine 
that a change of audit firm has occurred. Additionally, not more than one change 
should have occurred during the five-year period, since it would destroy the 
possibilities to identify initial fee discounts as well as the following increase in fee 
which are needed to conclude if low balling occurred. The last criterion is that the 
switch of audit firm needs to be voluntarily done by the company and thus not forced.  
 
3.2.1 Dropouts 
During our period of study, 107 changes of audit firm were identified. 56 of these 
switches fulfilled the criteria presented above. Out of these 56 switches, 21 were 
listed on Small cap, 21 on Mid cap, and 14 on Large cap. Hence, 51 dropouts were 
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Reason Dropouts 
Not publicly listed two years before the change 17 
Small cap 14 
Mid cap 2 
Large Cap 1 
Different accounting periods 12 
Small cap 7 
Mid cap 3 
Large cap 2 
Absence of a new audit firm signing the Auditor’s report 12 
Small cap 3 
Mid cap 2 
Large cap 7 
Information missing 7 
Small cap 5 
Mid cap 1 
Large cap 1 
Switches that occurred in the same period 2 
Mid cap 2 
The demise of Arthur Andersen 1 
Small cap 1 
Total 51 
Table 2 illustrates the dropouts of the study 
 
17 companies were excluded due to not being listed during the five years of study. As 
presented in Table 2, Small Cap-listed companies stood for 14 of these exclusions that 
is natural since these companies are not as established on the stock exchange as the 
larger corporations. 12 companies had different accounting periods in the annual 
reports under study and were excluded due to the potential bias in numbers. 
 
 12 companies were excluded due to the criteria of a new audit firm signing the 
Auditor’s report. These companies had a joint audit engagement prior to the switch. 
Companies that went from having two audit firms to only one of these firms were 
excluded from the study as well as they only switched one of the two audit firms. This 
is justified since the initial costs would be absent. However, switches from a joint 
audit to a third audit firm were included in this study since the initial costs would still 
occur. 
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In seven cases the information was missing or difficult to obtain, due to different 
reasons. For example, in some annual reports audit fee and audit fee related costs 
were not separately disclosed, and it would have been inaccurate to include these 
companies.  
 
Some companies have changed auditors more than one time during the five-year 
period and a low balling effect, according to our methodology, was not possible to 
measure; hence two switches were excluded.  
 
The demise of the audit firm Arthur Andersen in 2002 forced their clients to change 
audit firm. Most of the auditors as well as clients were taken over by Deloitte (SvD 
2002) and therefore cannot be analysed in this thesis due to its non-voluntary nature. 
Further, the switch does not have the increase in initial costs that is expected from a 
change of audit firm and should be excluded from this study. One company was 
excluded due to this reason. 
 
3.3 Data collection method 
To be able to examine if low balling exists in Sweden, voluntarily changes of audit 
firms during the years 2002-2010 were studied. Since our study includes data from 
five years, two years before the switch, the year of the switch and two years after, our 
data collection period extends from 2000 to 2012. The companies whose annual 
reports we chose to study are companies that were listed on the NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm (Small-, Mid- and Large cap) 2012-12-31. Retriever was used to establish 
which companies were listed on each cap. The data was then collected from the 
Annual report of each company and was either downloaded from their web page or 
from Retriever were annual reports sent to Bolagsverket (The Swedish companies 
registration office) are available. 
 
The data collected from each annual report was: Company Turnover, Total Assets and 
Audit Fee from the Group Income Statement, Balance Sheet and Notes as well as 
which audit firm that signed the Auditor’s Report. Hence, five annual reports were 
studied for each company that voluntarily changed audit firm. In some cases 
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companies changed accounting principles from one year to another during the period 
under study. This resulted in different retroactive figures in the annual report as 
required by law (IFRS 2012). Due to the lack of retroactive data for all five years, a 
decision was made to always collect the data from the annual report of the 
corresponding year. However, the differences between numbers due to changes in 
accounting principles were not significant.  
 
3.3.1 Explanation of terms 
As mentioned earlier, five years of data were collected from each switch of audit firm. 
The variables used in this study are presented in the Table 3.  
Variables 𝒕!𝟐	   𝒕!𝟏	   𝒕	   𝒕!𝟏	   𝒕!𝟐	   𝒕 = 𝒕!𝟏 + 𝒕!𝟐𝟐 	  
Audit Fee (F) 𝐹!!	   𝐹!!	   𝐹	   𝐹!!	   𝐹!!	   𝐹	  
Company Turnover (T) 𝑇!!	   𝑇!!	   𝑇	   𝑇!!	   𝑇!!	   𝑇	  
Total Assets (TA) 𝑇𝐴!!	   𝑇𝐴!!	   𝑇𝐴	   𝑇𝐴!!	   𝑇𝐴!!	   𝑇𝐴	  
Ratio of Audit 
fee/Company Turnover (R) 𝑅!!	   𝑅!!	   𝑅	   𝑅!!	   𝑅!!	   𝑅	  
Table 3 illustrates the different variables in this study 
 
3.3.2 Determination of auditee size 
As previously stated, Company Turnover, or Total Assets is normally used when 
measuring auditee size. The study includes three variables; Audit Fee, Company 
Turnover, and Total Assets. Firstly, a test of correlation that aims at determining 
which auditee size measure correlates best, and thus answering the first research 
question was made. A very strong relationship between the factors are considered 
when the correlation coefficient is between 0.8-1; a strong relationship occurs when 
the correlation coefficient is between 0.6-0.8, while a moderate relationship between 
the factors is considered when the correlation coefficient is between 0.4-0.6. A 
correlation coefficient between 0.2-0.4 is considered to have a weak relationship, and 
no relationship occurs when the correlation coefficient is between 0-0.2 (UNCC 
2014).  
 
The data used in the test of correlation is the average audit fee (𝐹) and the average 
auditee size the two years prior to the change of audit firm (𝑇  and 𝑇𝐴). By using the 
average measurements two years prior to the change, possible low balling affected 
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data is excluded. Each cap was examined separately as well as in total to answer 
research questions number one and four.  
 
3.3.3 Audit fee ratio 
The variable that mainly drives the price is auditee size (Hay et al 2006; Pong & 
Whittington 1994) and is therefore important to include in this study. To exclude 
possible effects of the audit fee due to changes in auditee size, an audit fee ratio of 
Audit Fee divided by Company Turnover was calculated.   
 
3.4 Data analysis 
To be able to answer the first part of our problem statement, if low balling exists on 
the Swedish audit market, two aspects of the audit engagement needs to be studied, 
according to DeAngelo’s (1981) definition. An initial fee discount as well as an 
increase in fee the following years needs to be present. To enable answering if these 
two aspects exist on the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, an audit fee ratio was calculated 
for each of five years to exclude possible changes in auditee size, which as previously 
mentioned, has a big impact on audit fees. The auditee size measure that was used is 
Company Turnover. 
 
An average audit fee ratio, 𝑅,  is calculated of the two years prior to the change of 
audit firm. This serves as an estimated normal audit fee ratio. By comparing the ratios 
of 𝑅  to 𝑅 (audit fee ratio the year of the change), a percentage change in audit fee 
ratio was calculated to establish if an initial fee discount was present. To examine if 
an increase in audit fee the subsequent years after the switch was present on the 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, the ratios of the two years after the switch of audit firm, 𝑅!!  and 𝑅!!, were compared to the estimated normal audit fee ratio,  𝑅, to establish 
the percentage change.  
 
To be able to answer the second part of the problem statement, if the size of the 
company affects the extent of low balling, the data was divided into Small-, Mid- and 
Large Cap as well as the Total for NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. The average 
percentage change for each cap and year was then calculated and presented.  
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To gain some insight of the shape of the distribution, a histogram and standard 
deviation are provided for the Total of NASDAQ OMX Stockholm for 𝑡, 𝑡!! and 𝑡!!. 
Due to the relatively small size of the population a histogram was done for total, and 
not for each cap.  
 
The result of Mid cap the second year after the change, 𝑡!!, stands out from the 
results of Small and Large cap as well as Total. An attempt was made to identify and 
remove outliers that affected the results. To achieve a low balling effect on Mid cap, 
nearly 20% of the companies had to be removed from the study. It would not have 
been accurate or truthfully to seriously affect the results in this way, since the shape 
of the distribution is widely spread out from the mean for the Total of NASDAQ 
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4. Empirics 
In this chapter the empirics of the thesis is presented. It starts by introducing the 
results of the first research question as well as the differences between the caps 
followed by the results of research questions number two, three and four. 
4.1 Correlation 
To find the answer to the first research question, “Which measure of auditee size, 
Total assets or Company turnover, correlates better with the audit fee?” and the 
supplementary research question number four “Do the results differ among different 
caps?”, a test of correlation for each cap as well as total has been done and presented 
in Table 4.  
NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm 
Correlation Audit fees and 
Company Turnover 
Correlation Audit fees 
and Total Assets 
Small 0.88 0.66 
Mid 0.82 0.47 
Large 0.70 0.72 
Total 0.83 0.82 
Table 4 illustrates the correlation between Audit fees and Company turnover as well as 
the correlation between Audit fees and Total assets 
 
The correlation coefficient on Small cap is 0.88 between Audit fees and Company 
Turnover and 0.66 between Audit Fees and Total Assets. On Mid cap, the correlation 
coefficient is 0.82 for Company Turnover and 0.47 for Total Assets, whereas on 
Large cap it is 0.7 for Company Turnover and 0.72 for Total Assets. As for the Total 
of NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, the correlation coefficient is 0.83 between Audit Fees 
and Company Turnover and 0.82 between Audit Fees and Total Assets.  
 
Company Turnover has a higher degree of correlation with Audit Fees for companies 
listed on Small and Mid cap as well as the Total of NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. On 
Large cap, there is a slighter higher correlation, 0.02 units, between Audit Fees and 
Total Assets.  
 
The relationship between Audit Fees and Company Turnover is very strong on Small 
and Mid cap as well as the Total of NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. The correlation 
	  	  	   25	  
coefficient for Large cap shows only a strong relationship between Audit Fees and 
Company Turnover. Audit Fees and Total Assets show a very strong relationship only 
on the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm Total where the correlation coefficient is 0.82. On 
Small and Large cap the relationship is strong, while on Mid cap the relationship is 
moderate.  
 
4.2 The percentage changes in the Audit Fee ratio 
To be able to answer the second and third research questions, “Does the ratio of Audit 
Fee/Company Turnover decrease the year of the change of audit firm?” and “Does 
the ratio of Audit Fee/Company Turnover increase the following two years after the 
change of audit firm?” an average percentage change of the initial audit fees and the 
two following years are calculated. In line with the methodology of this thesis, the 
percentage change is calculated from the average ratio (𝑅) of two years before the 
switch. The results are presented in Table 5.  
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm Total 𝒕	   𝒕!𝟏	   𝒕!𝟐	  
Average percentage change of 𝑅 -17.53% -4.57% -0.61% 
Table 5 illustrates the average percentage changes on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm Total 
 
An average initial audit fee discount of -17.53% is present for the NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm listed companies. Hence, audit fees decrease the year of the change of 
audit firm. The second year after the switch, the discount compared to the estimated 
normal audit fee is -4.57%. An increase of audit fees is thus present from the year of 
the switch. The third year after the switch, the fees are almost back at the estimated 
normal audit fee at -0.62%. Hence, audit fees increase the following two years after 
the change of audit firm.  
 
In line with the methodology the shape of the distribution is presented in the 
histograms in Figures 1-3 for year 𝑡, 𝑡!! and 𝑡!!.  
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Figure 1 illustrates the shape of the distribution of the average percentage changes in 
audit fees the year of the switch, 𝑡, for the Total of NASDAQ OMX Stockholm 
 
As presented above, the mean is -18%, due to the rounding of numbers, and the 
frequency distribution is widely spread around the mean. An initial audit fee discount 
is found in 44 audit firm switches and not found in 12 audit firm switches. The 
standard deviation for year t is 29%.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the shape of the distribution of the average percentage changes in 
audit fees year  𝑡!! for the Total of NASDAQ OMX Stockholm 
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As Figure 2 illustrates, the distribution is skewed right. The mean is -5%, due to 
rounding in numbers, and the standard deviation is 40.6%. A discount effect year 𝑡!!  is found in 33 audit firm switches and not found in 23 audit firm switches. 
 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the shape of the distribution of the average percentage changes in 
audit fees year 𝑡!! for the Total of NASDAQ OMX Stockholm 
 
As presented in Figure 3, the mean is -1%, due to the rounding of numbers, and the 
standard deviation is 42.8%. A discount effect is found in 31 audit firm switches and 
not found in 25 audit firm switches the third year. 
 
4.3 Different size companies 
The fourth research question, “Do the results differ among different caps?”, requires 
the companies to be divided into the three different caps of NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm. The results are presented in Table 6. 
 
4.3.1 Small cap 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm Small cap 𝒕	   𝒕!𝟏	   𝒕!𝟐	  
Average percentage change of 𝑅 -28.92% -20.57% -9.30% 
Table 6 illustrates the average percentage changes on Small cap  
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The average initial audit fee discount when switching audit firm is -28.92% on Small 
cap. The discount the second year after the switch is -20.57% from the estimated 
normal audit fee. The third year the discount is -9.30% and is thus not back to the 
normal level. An initial audit fee discount is hence present as well as an increase of 
fee the following two years.  
 
4.3.2 Mid cap 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm Mid cap 𝒕	   𝒕!𝟏	   𝒕!𝟐	  
Average percentage change of 𝑅 -10.00% 6.63% -1.05% 
Table 7 illustrates the average percentage changes on Mid cap 
 
The average initial audit fee discount on Mid cap is -10%. The second year after the 
switch, an increase of 6.63% of the estimated normal fee is present while the third 
year a discount from the estimated normal audit fee is -1.05%. An initial fee discount 
is hence present during the first year of audit engagement. The second year, an 
increase in fee over the normal estimated fee is present but not the third year where a 
discount is found again.  
 
4.3.3 Large cap 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm Large cap 𝒕	   𝒕!𝟏	   𝒕!𝟐	  
Average percentage change of 𝑅 -11.76% 2.64% 13.06% 
Table 8 illustrates the average percentage changes on Large cap 
 
The average initial audit fee discount is -11.76% when companies listed on Large cap 
switch audit firm. The audit fee ratio has increased by 2.64% from the estimated 
normal fee by the second year and by 13.06% the third year. An initial audit fee 
discount as well as an increase of the audit fee the following two years are thus 
present on Large cap.  
 
4.3.4 Summary of different size companies 
Compiled results 𝒕	   𝒕!𝟏	   𝒕!𝟐	  
OMX Total -17.53% -4.57% -0.61% 
Small cap -28.92% -20.57% -9.30% 
Mid cap -10.00% 6.63% -1.05% 
Large cap -11.76% 2.64% 13.06% 
Table 9 illustrates the compiled results of this study  
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As presented in Table 9 the results differ among different caps. The greatest initial 
audit fee discount exists on Small cap with -28.92%. The initial audit fee discount on 
Mid cap and Large cap are alike with discounts of -10.00% and -11.76%. The greatest 
increase of audit fees the following two years after the change exists on Large cap 
where an increase of 24.82 percentage points is found the third year. Companies listed 
on Small cap have an average increase of audit fees by 19.62 percentage points the 
third year after the change. Companies listed on Mid cap have an average increase of 
audit fees by 8.95 percentage points the third year after the switch and is thus the cap 
that has the lowest increase of audit fees. The results show that there are differences 
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5. Analysis 
In this section the results of this thesis are put in relation to previous research that is 
outlined in the frame of references. The structure of the chapter is generally the same 
as the empirics’ chapter to enable the reader to follow the connections between the 
two chapters.  
5.1 Correlation 
The results of correlation in this study agree with earlier research (Hay et al 2006) that 
auditee size is highly significant to set the level of audit fees. Company Turnover and 
Total Assets show a very strong or strong correlation with Audit Fees across 
companies listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. However, Company Turnover 
correlates better than Total Assets with Audit Fees on Small cap, Mid cap and Total 
for all caps. Audit firms use Company Turnover as a first approximation of the price 
of audit (Oxera 2006), which is reasonable due to the results of this study.  
 
On Large cap, the correlation shows only a strong relationship with Audit Fees for 
both Company Turnover and Total Assets. However, Audit Fees correlates slightly 
better with Total Assets but the difference is insignificant. The lower correlation 
coefficient of audit fees and auditee size could be due to other important factors that 
affect the price of audit. Large corporations may have a greater number of 
subsidiaries, which earlier studies have shown to be an important factor that affects 
the price of an audit engagement (Simunic 1980). 
 
5.2 Low balling on the Swedish audit market 
The results show that low balling behaviour exists among audit firms when competing 
over clients listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm since an initial audit fee discount is 
present as well as an increase of audit fees the following two years after the switch. 
The definition of low balling by DeAngelo (1981) is hence confirmed. This result 
disagrees with Dye’s (1991) prediction that low balling only occurs in settings where 
audit fees are not publicly disclosed. The results, however, show a lesser initial audit 
fee discount, -17,53%, than the results presented by Jonasson & Tungel (2012) who 
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concluded that an initial audit fee discount of -27,06% occurred among companies 
listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. Further, Jonasson & Tungel (2012) found that 
the audit fees were only 79.4% of the estimated normal fee the third year. The results 
of our thesis indicate that audit fees are very close to the estimated normal level, -
0,61%, by the third year.  
 
Figures 1-3 in the previous chapter show a distribution pattern widely spread around 
the mean. Also, the standard deviation for all three years is high; 29% the year of the 
switch, 40.6% the second year and 42.8% the third year after the switch. This is 
logical due to the wide spread shown in the histograms. The results indicate that not 
all audit firm switches have the characteristics of low balling. The year of the switch, 
an initial audit fee discount is present among the majority, in 44 out of 56 companies 
that switched audit firm. The second year after the switch, a discount effect is shown 
by 33 of the companies, which also make the majority. The third year after the switch, 
a discount effect is present among 31 of the companies that switched audit firm. 
Hence, 25 companies are above the estimated normal audit fee by the third year. As 
mentioned before, our results show that audit fees, at an average, are almost back to 
normal levels by the third year. The histogram presented in Figure 3, however, shows 
that only a minority of the companies are back to normal or higher levels of audit fees 
the third year. This indicates that audit firms need longer audit tenures to recover the 
initial losses.  
 
The differences between the results presented by Jonasson & Tungel (2012) and the 
results of our study could be due to the different measure of auditee size. The results 
of correlation, however, in this thesis have shown a similar relationship between 
Audit fees and Company turnover and Audit fees and Total assets of the Total of 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. Since the correlation is fairly equal, the differences of 
percentage changes of audit fees shown in this thesis and in the thesis by Jonasson & 
Tungel (2012) could very likely be due to other factors. 
 
The differences could suggestively be the differences in included switches. Jonasson 
& Tungel (2012) have a larger proportion of switches from companies listed on Small 
cap. As the results of Small cap in our thesis have shown, the initial fee discount is 
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larger, -28,92%, than the initial fee discount of the Total, -17,53%. Small cap-listed 
companies also show that audit fees have not recovered to normal levels by the third 
year where a discount of -9,30% is still present. The differences between the results 
could hence be partly explained by the difference in proportion of Small cap-listed 
companies, which, as this thesis has shown, have a larger initial fee discount and have 
not recovered to normal levels by the third year. Jonasson & Tungel (2012) also used 
a different methodology and a different composition of companies to calculate the 
low balling effect, which could also have affected the results.  
 
5.2.1 Results compared to research done internationally  
Contradictory to the findings of Simunic (1980) and Palmrose (1986) in the US and 
by Francis (1984) in Australia where no low balling was found, our study shows that 
low balling exists on the Swedish audit market when competing over companies listed 
on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. However, the above studies only tested for low 
balling indirectly or had a small sample, which could have affected their results. 
These studies are also old, and the market of auditing as well as audit regulations have 
changed since that time.   
 
Other studies in the 1980’s and 1990’s in the US and UK found that low balling 
existed since an initial audit fee discount of -22% to -25% occurred (Simon & Francis 
1988; Ettredge & Greenberg 1990; Gregory & Collier 1996). The fees were back to 
normal levels by the fourth year (Simon & Francis 1988; Gregory & Collier 1996). 
Our study found a slightly smaller low balling effect on the Total of NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm, a lower initial fee discount and a quicker recovery to normal audit fees. 
For audit firms to be able to profit from the audit engagement, longer audit tenures are 
needed since the initial losses due to the initial discounts are not recovered during the 
period of study. This could affect auditor independence if audit firms need their 
clients to be financial success companies to recover the receivables created by the 
initial audit fee discounts (The Cohen Report 1978). However, the new audit firms 
could be more effective in their work due to expertise in the respective industry (Chan 
1999) and hence be able to lower the audit fee and do not depend on future 
receivables from the client. Auditor independence is thus not threatened, according to 
Chan (1999). 
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Francis & Simon (1987) and Baber, Brooks & Ricks (1987) also concluded that low 
balling existed in the US. However, their results are difficult to compare to ours. 
Francis & Simon (1987) used a very small sample of 12 switches due to the question 
of low balling being a side issue of the paper. Baber, Brooks & Ricks (1987) 
researched low balling on North Carolina county governments which makes 
comparisons difficult since our sample only includes publicly listed companies.  
 
The most recent research done in the area of low balling is presented by Krauß, 
Quosigk & Zülch (2014) in Germany. An initial audit fee discount was discovered to 
be -13% (Krauß, Quosigk & Zülch 2014), which is a smaller initial audit fee discount 
than our results, -17.53%. Krauß, Quosigk & Zülch (2014) found no discount effect 
the second year, whereas our study shows a discount effect the second year after the 
switch. However, Krauß, Quosigk & Zülch (2014) only included large corporations in 
their study while our results of the Total of NASDAQ OMX Stockholm include Small 
and Mid size companies as well. The results of Krauß, Quosigk & Zülch (2014) and 
our results of companies listed on Large cap are more similar. Our study of Large cap 
shows an initial fee discount of -11.76% as well as no discount effect the subsequent 
years after the switch. This implies that the existence of low balling when audit firms 
compete over large clients is similar in Sweden and Germany.  
 
5.3 Low balling and different size companies 
As stated in the previous chapter, the results of the different caps differ. The results of 
Small cap indicate that an initial audit fee discount is present as well as an increase of 
fee the following two years. The definition of low balling by DeAngelo (1981) is 
hence met, and low balling occurs among audit firms when competing over clients 
listed on Small cap. There is still a discount effect by the third year of audit tenure, 
the audit fee is -9.30% of the estimated normal audit fee. The greatest initial audit fee 
discount of all three caps occurs on Small cap. This could be explained by that 
companies listed on Small cap find price as the most important factor when choosing 
audit firm. This agrees with statements made by Johnson & Lys (1990). The results 
indicate that audit firms need audit engagements to be longer on Small cap to be able 
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to profit from the engagement which, as mentioned earlier, could threaten auditor 
independence.  
 
Mid cap shows a different pattern in numbers compared to the other caps and Total. 
An initial audit fee discount is found the year of the switch of audit firm. An increase 
of audit fees above the normal estimated audit fees the second year is also found. 
However, the third year of engagement a discount effect is found again. The results 
are hence ambiguous and do not agree with the definition by DeAngelo (1981). Initial 
audit fee discounts exist on Mid cap, but no low balling.  
 
On Large cap, on the other hand, the definition of low balling by DeAngelo (1981) is 
met and low balling exists. The initial audit fee discount on Large cap is less than the 
discount found on the Total of NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. Our results are 
contradictory to the results found by Carson et al (2012) who reason that large clients 
can receive a greater discount due to the status and major audit fees, which these 
companies bring to the audit firm. Oxera (2006) presented evidence that companies 
choose quality over price when choosing audit firm. An explanation of our results 
could thus be that larger corporations find quality more important than the price and 
thus do not switch to the audit firm that tenders at lowest price, which is contradictory 
to our findings on Small cap. The audit fees on Large cap do not only recover, but are 
increased by 13.06% the third year. This could indicate that audit firms increased the 
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6. Conclusions 
In this chapter the problem statement “Does low balling exist on the Swedish audit 
market and does the size of the company affect the extent of low balling?” is 
answered. The conclusions are drawn from the analysis. 
 
To be able to answer the first part of the problem statement of this thesis, if low 
balling exists on the Swedish audit market, the data on 56 identified switches of audit 
firms during 2002-2010 on the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm were collected. The 
results indicate that low balling exists on the Swedish audit market. An initial audit 
fee discount as well as a following increase of audit fees is present among companies 
listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. The average initial audit fee discount is -
17.53% of the estimated normal audit fee. The second year the average audit fee 
discount is -4.57%, and the third year the average audit fee discount is -0.61% of the 
estimated normal audit fee. This indicates that audit fees are nearly back to normal 
levels after three years of audit tenure. However, low balling does not appear in all 
switches of audit firms but an initial audit fee discount occurs in the majority of 
switches.  
 
To be able to answer the second part of the problem statement of this thesis, if the size 
of the company affects the extent of low balling, 56 identified switches were divided 
into three groups depending on which cap the company was listed on. The results 
show considerable differences between the three caps. The results indicate that low 
balling exists on Small and Large cap. On Small cap, the average initial audit fee 
discount is -28.92%, the second year an average audit fee discount is -20.57%, and 
the third year the average audit fee discount is -9.30%, when compared to the 
estimated normal audit fee. Large cap shows a lesser initial audit fee discount of -
11.76% the year of the switch, and the audit fees are over the estimated normal audit 
fees the second year by 2.64% as well as 13.06% the third year. The results of 
companies listed on Mid cap show an initial audit fee discount of -10.00% and an 
increase of audit fees over the estimated normal audit fee by 6.63% the second year. 
The third year after the switch, an audit fee discount is yet again found by -1.05%. 
Hence, initial audit fee discounts exist on Mid cap, but not low balling.  
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7. Suggestions for future research  
This chapter provides the reader with suggestions for future research in the area of 
low balling. These suggestions are made in the light of the findings from our thesis.  
 
Our study indicates that low balling exists when audit firms compete over clients 
listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm; however, the possible effects on auditor 
independence were not studied. There have been mixed results internationally in 
previous studies on low balling influence on auditor independence (The Cohen Report 
1978; DeAngelo 1981; Gu & Lee 1998; Chan 1999). Further research on this issue in 
Sweden should obtain a deeper understanding of auditor independence since it is a 
highly debatable issue, especially after the financial crisis in 2008 (European Union 
2013).  
 
New regulations from the European Union introducing mandatory audit firm rotation 
every 10 years, with the possibility of member states to choose additional 10 years, to 
enhance audit quality and auditor independence were presented in December 2013 
(European Union 2013). The mandatory rotation of 10 or 20 years will enter in 
Sweden in 2016. More frequent switches of audit firms and costly tender processes 
among listed companies may occur after the legislative change and could possibly 
lead to changes in competition on the audit market and difference in price pressure. It 
would be interesting to study if the extent of low balling increases when there is a 
time frame of the audit engagement. Another interesting subject to study is if the 
anticipated effects on auditor independence are achieved after the legislative change.  
 
The differential results shown on Mid cap in this thesis also requires further studies as 
to why they differ from the other caps. Research on the phenomenon of low balling in 
Sweden that includes more variables than auditee size is advisable for a deeper 
understanding of the low balling extent. Examples of other factors that have been 
discussed driving audit fees are variables such as number of subsidiaries as well as 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Audit fees 
Appendix 1 shows audit fees paid by companies in absolute numbers in MSEK, if not 
other specified, the year of the change as well as two years before and after.  	  
Small Cap 
Year of 
the change 𝑭!𝟐 𝑭!𝟏 𝑭 𝑭!𝟏 𝑭!𝟐 
ACAP Invest AB 2007 1.13 1.17 1.45 1.77 1.59 
Addnode Group 
Aktiebolag 2003 1.06 0.20 0.81 1.15 1.27 
Anoto Group AB 2008 0.32 0.38 0.35 0.31 0.31 
CYBERCOM 
GROUP AB 2008 1.20 2.01 2.77 2.01 2.18 
DORO AB 2007 1.50 1.10 1.10 0.90 1.20 
Duroc Aktiebolag 2003 0.71 0.89 0.54 0.46 0.53 
Duroc Aktiebolag 2006 0.46 0.55 0.47 0.83 1.20 
Elanders AB 2008 1.68 2.13 2.17 2.46 2.02 
Fingerprint Cards 
AB 2003 0.25 0.18 0.08 0.10 0.10 
Image Systems AB 2002 0.44 0.37 0.16 0.20 0.22 
Image Systems AB 2006 0.22 0.29 0.39 0.61 0.50 
Micronic Mydata 
AB 2006 1.38 1.49 1.33 0.96 1.12 
Midway Holding 
Aktiebolag 2005 2.60 2.80 1.30 1.90 2.40 
NOTE AB  2008 1.61 1.59 0.95 1.24 1.10 
NOVOTEK 
Aktiebolag 2003 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.20 
Proact IT Group 
AB 2006 1.87 1.53 0.81 0.94 1.03 
PROBI Aktiebolag 2002 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.20 0.25 
ProfilGruppen AB 2007 0.80 0.80 0.60 0.70 0.70 
Semcon 
Aktiebolag 2007 2.46 2.76 2.30 2.70 2.40 
Stockwik 
Förvaltning AB 2008 1.38 1.05 0.31 0.53 0.48 
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Mid Cap 
Year of the 
change 𝑭!𝟐 𝑭!𝟏 𝑭 𝑭!𝟏 𝑭!𝟐 
Avanza Bank 
Holding AB 2007 0.58 1.00 0.92 1.46 1.04 
Betsson AB 2008 0.86 0.43 2.12 1.68 1.15 
Eniro AB 2004 5.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 
Fastighets AB 
Balder 2009 1.10 1.10 1.20 1.20 1.40 
Fenix Outdoor AB 2006 0.72 0.75 0.40 1.12 1.63 
G & L Beijer AB 2005 1.23 1.79 1.98 2.21 2.54 
Gunnebo 
Aktiebolag 2008 10.80 10.20 7.40 8.80 7.10 
Haldex Aktiebolag 2003 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 
Heba Fastighets 
Aktiebolag 2007 0.28 0.25 0.32 0.35 0.37 
Höganäs AB  2003 2.20 1.00 2.60 4.40 4.10 
Intrum Justitia AB 2004 4.70 9.00 8.30 11.80 8.40 
JM AB 2004 3.50 4.70 3.80 4.00 4.00 
Net Entertainment 
NE AB 2008 0.16 0.25 0.51 0.72 0.91 
Nobia AB 2007 9.00 10.00 10.00 11.00 12.00 
Nolato Aktiebolag 2008 1.65 2.29 1.68 2.06 2.01 
Nordnet AB 2004 2.34 1.71 1.62 2.69 2.53 
Proffice 
Aktiebolag 2007 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
SkiStar Aktiebolag 2004 1.13 1.48 0.61 0.87 0.96 
TradeDoubler AB  2009 2.80 5.30 4.73 6.77 4.46 
ÅF AB 2003 1.80 2.00 1.60 2.21 2.73 
ÅF AB 2007 2.73 3.49 2.35 3.17 3.55 
       
Large Cap 
Year of the 
change 𝑭!𝟐 𝑭!𝟏 𝑭 𝑭!𝟏 𝑭!𝟐 
Aktiebolaget 
Electrolux 2002 28.00 31.00 38.00 45.00 46.00 
Aktiebolaget SKF 2005 24.00 24.00 25.00 46.00 33.00 
Atlas Copco 
Aktiebolag 2010 53.00 58.00 44.00 48.00 51.00 
BillerudKorsnäs 
Aktiebolag 2009 2.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 
Boliden AB 2009 6.00 6.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Getinge AB 2008 10.00 16.00 13.00 17.00 18.00 
NCC Aktiebolag 2008 12.00 14.00 13.00 15.00 15.00 
Stora Enso AB, 
MEURO 2008 6.10 7.60 4.90 4.10 5.10 
Swedish Match 
AB 2004 14.00 13.00 13.00 14.00 26.00 
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Tele2 AB 2004 17.00 17.00 15.00 21.00 30.00 
TeliaSonera 
Aktiebolag 2004 28.00 53.00 41.00 49.00 82.00 
Tieto Sweden AB 2006 4.09 3.81 2.00 2.11 2.20 
Trelleborg AB 2004 16.00 16.00 22.00 26.00 30.00 
Wallenstam AB 2006 1.00 1.00 1.30 1.40 1.90 
Appendix 2: Company Turnover            
Appendix 2 shows Company Turnover of the companies in absolute numbers in 
MSEK, if not other specified, the year of the change as well as two years before and 
after. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   




change 𝑻!𝟐 𝑻!𝟏 𝑻 𝑻!𝟏 𝑻!𝟐 
ACAP Invest 
AB 2007 432.88 542.89 863.54 925.68 713.40 
Addnode 
Group 
Aktiebolag 2003 315.01 29.11 196.42 322.15 579.94 
Anoto Group 
AB 2008 108.73 168.77 182.20 205.86 208.40 
CYBERCOM 
GROUP AB 2008 534.17 1155.99 1771.01 1714.43 1501.84 
DORO AB 2007 621.30 433.20 346.30 632.50 488.40 
Duroc 
Aktiebolag 2003 213.72 221.60 212.56 192.50 203.66 
Duroc 
Aktiebolag 2006 192.50 203.66 199.48 560.40 698.00 
Elanders AB 2008 1988.18 2035.62 2191.18 1756.74 1705.92 
Fingerprint 
Cards AB 2003 2.05 4.41 5.17 2.85 2.71 
Image 
Systems AB 2002 81.66 67.57 49.06 70.71 30.13 
Image 
Systems AB 2006 30.13 59.66 78.53 114.80 59.00 
Micronic 
Mydata AB 2006 839.48 1275.76 1204.14 522.98 568.62 
Midway 
Holding 
Aktiebolag 2005 1949.10 2082.20 2070.90 2358.20 2449.50 
NOTE AB  2008 1741.49 1743.79 1709.45 1200.06 1210.72 
NOVOTEK 
Aktiebolag 2003 145.83 198.36 198.48 191.93 199.10 
Proact IT 2006 833.59 689.22 756.48 864.77 641.98 
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Group AB 
PROBI 
Aktiebolag 2002 17.58 18.99 26.06 24.46 31.62 
ProfilGruppen 
AB 2007 926.70 1086.90 1179.40 1086.10 764.30 
Semcon 
Aktiebolag 2007 1495.73 1614.12 2497.40 3298.80 2281.10 
Stockwik 
Förvaltning 
AB 2008 556.68 135.06 206.01 153.06 125.53 
Vitrolife AB 2007 120.12 171.26 188.94 225.14 274.63 




change 𝑻!𝟐 𝑻!𝟏 𝑻 𝑻!𝟏 𝑻!𝟐 
Avanza Bank 
Holding AB 2007 331.00 556.00 751.00 779.00 603.00 
Betsson AB 2008 391.50 648.96 1037.76 1299.71 1603.21 
Eniro AB 2004 4737.00 4901.00 4918.00 4827.00 6697.00 
Fastighets AB 
Balder 2009 678.30 632.60 854.00 1333.00 1466.00 
Fenix Outdoor 
AB 2006 540.16 655.55 742.77 844.97 961.06 
G & L Beijer 
AB 2005 1400.92 1973.67 2332.87 2592.21 3135.97 
Gunnebo 
Aktiebolag 2008 6726.60 7025.00 6903.20 6788.40 5938.00 
Haldex 
Aktiebolag 2003 6225.00 6414.00 6036.00 6759.00 7486.00 
Heba 
Fastighets 
Aktiebolag 2007 204.80 191.56 183.85 197.04 205.36 
Höganäs AB  2003 3245.00 3249.00 3750.00 4162.00 4594.00 
Intrum Justitia 
AB 2004 2774.90 2864.60 2848.80 2823.20 2939.60 
JM AB 2004 8872.00 7787.00 8414.00 9887.00 12065.00 
Net 
Entertainment 
NE AB 2008 99.48 131.15 204.60 299.72 368.17 
Nobia AB 2007 12442.00 15590.00 16622.00 15991.00 15418.00 
Nolato 
Aktiebolag 2008 2702.00 2421.00 2824.00 2602.00 3375.00 
Nordnet AB 2004 200.08 228.67 358.17 623.34 960.47 
Proffice 
Aktiebolag 2007 2421.00 2851.00 3791.00 4266.00 3909.00 
SkiStar 
Aktiebolag 2004 886.13 959.01 989.95 977.01 1280.49 
TradeDoubler 2009 2663.64 3456.70 3014.35 2840.07 2612.70 
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AB  
ÅF AB 2003 1960.54 1914.14 1993.98 2135.97 2268.92 
ÅF AB 2007 2268.92 3113.59 3862.35 4568.84 4677.91 


















SKF 2005 41377.00 44826.00 49285.00 53101.00 58559.00 
Atlas Copco 
Aktiebolag 2010 74177.00 63762.00 69875.00 81203.00 90533.00 
BillerudKorsn
äs Aktiebolag 2009 7758.00 7792.00 7760.00 8828.00 9343.00 
Boliden AB 2009 33204.00 30987.00 27635.00 30038.00 40323.00 
Getinge AB 2008 13001.00 16445.00 19272.00 22816.00 22172.00 
NCC 
Aktiebolag 2008 55876.00 58397.00 57465.00 56005.00 49420.00 
Stora Enso 
AB, MEURO  2008 14593.90 13373.60 11028.80 8945.10 10298.90 
Swedish 
Match AB 2004 13643.00 13036.00 13007.00 13311.00 12911.00 
Tele2 AB 2004 31282.00 36911.00 43033.00 49943.00 50306.00 
TeliaSonera 
Aktiebolag 2004 59483.00 82425.00 81937.00 87661.00 91060.00 
Tieto Sweden 
AB 2006 395.54 454.79 425.25 445.09 5182.44 
Trelleborg AB 2004 17630.00 17960.00 22912.00 23509.00 27041.00 
Wallenstam 
AB 2006 1110.10 1219.80 1239.00 1241.00 1250.00 
Appendix 3: Total Assets 
Appendix 3 shows the value of Total Assets in absolute numbers in MSEK, if not 





change 𝑻𝑨!𝟐 𝑻𝑨!𝟏 𝑻𝑨 𝑻𝑨!𝟏 𝑻𝑨!𝟐 
ACAP Invest 
AB 2007 670.36 451.11 691.22 658.31 511.60 
Addnode Group 
Aktiebolag 2003 95.64 7.29 212.67 523.45 761.59 
Anoto Group 
AB 2008 576.98 564.53 601.44 554.90 479.79 
CYBERCOM 2008 408.70 1388.44 2028.43 1735.45 1512.66 
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GROUP AB 
DORO AB 2007 270.00 181.70 161.40 170.10 232.30 
Duroc 
Aktiebolag 2003 277.13 244.72 181.40 194.57 207.49 
Duroc 
Aktiebolag 2006 194.57 207.49 233.71 463.50 448.90 
Elanders AB 2008 1641.08 2224.28 2386.74 2113.75 2012.32 
Fingerprint 
Cards AB 2003 130.72 103.95 81.87 56.41 61.05 
Image Systems 
AB 2002 106.91 83.82 49.47 39.61 22.50 
Image Systems 
AB 2006 22.50 92.42 92.85 118.40 83.40 
Micronic 
Mydata AB 2006 1571.78 1870.85 1709.73 1506.66 1376.43 
Midway 
Holding 
Aktiebolag 2005 1197.70 1137.70 1254.70 1364.00 1403.30 
NOTE AB  2008 888.21 948.11 948.28 753.05 693.53 
NOVOTEK 
Aktiebolag 2003 106.81 120.58 140.37 132.22 141.70 
Proact IT Group 
AB 2006 440.98 439.05 474.45 515.55 644.31 
PROBI 
Aktiebolag 2002 111.46 110.39 75.32 72.23 93.07 
ProfilGruppen 
AB 2007 616.90 606.30 615.90 563.60 499.30 
Semcon 
Aktiebolag 2007 669.38 663.26 2103.80 1776.20 1264.30 
Stockwik 
Förvaltning AB 2008 189.52 324.26 214.88 155.05 100.83 
Vitrolife AB 2007 211.37 271.03 299.46 342.66 359.32 




change 𝑻𝑨!𝟐 𝑻𝑨!𝟏 𝑻𝑨 𝑻𝑨!𝟏 𝑻𝑨!𝟐 
Avanza Bank 
Holding AB 2007 4505.00 8721.00 14449.00 15597.00 27795.00 
Betsson AB 2008 592.55 843.61 1148.45 1392.19 1488.13 
Eniro AB 2004 7320.00 7161.00 7163.00 19542.00 18213.00 
Fastighets AB 
Balder 2009 7582.20 7945.90 13800.00 15065.00 18978.00 
Fenix Outdoor 
AB 2006 410.93 470.30 520.81 588.21 639.65 
G & L Beijer 
AB 2005 884.77 1429.00 1462.43 1542.15 1985.15 
Gunnebo 
Aktiebolag 2008 4687.20 4837.30 5262.10 4336.30 3735.00 
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Haldex 
Aktiebolag 2003 4203.00 3859.00 3596.00 3885.00 4662.00 
Heba Fastighets 
Aktiebolag 2007 2552.53 2687.32 3130.90 3058.49 3493.34 
Höganäs AB  2003 4408.00 4205.00 4708.00 4742.00 5253.00 
Intrum Justitia 
AB 2004 3737.30 3680.60 3547.50 4136.00 4461.50 
JM AB 2004 10628.00 9145.00 8239.00 8155.00 8406.00 
Net 
Entertainment 
NE AB 2008 56.56 98.09 162.01 248.68 306.87 
Nobia AB 2007 7918.00 9624.00 10290.00 11338.00 10456.00 
Nolato 
Aktiebolag 2008 1724.00 1918.00 2126.00 2113.00 2350.00 
Nordnet AB 2004 1437.17 1814.02 2779.34 5873.67 10077.84 
Proffice 
Aktiebolag 2007 987.00 1126.00 1432.00 1500.00 1571.00 
SkiStar 
Aktiebolag 2004 1744.41 1670.48 1895.84 2038.09 2827.97 
TradeDoubler 
AB  2009 2237.00 1551.29 1725.58 1415.73 1436.64 
ÅF AB 2003 1276.33 1092.29 1121.77 1295.75 1220.13 
ÅF AB 2007 1220.13 2300.23 2795.58 3609.53 3582.51 




change 𝑻𝑨!𝟐 𝑻𝑨!𝟏 𝑻𝑨 𝑻𝑨!𝟏 𝑻𝑨!𝟐 
Aktiebolaget 
Electrolux 2002 87289.00 94447.00 85424.00 77028.00 74932.00 
Aktiebolaget 
SKF 2005 36326.00 35014.00 40349.00 46238.00 46331.00 
Atlas Copco 
Aktiebolag 2010 75394.00 67874.00 71622.00 75109.00 81149.00 
BillerudKorsnäs 
Aktiebolag 2009 9202.00 9021.00 9081.00 9200.00 9335.00 
Boliden AB 2009 27231.00 30252.00 33258.00 35128.00 37615.00 
Getinge AB 2008 15877.00 22970.00 33032.00 37498.00 34585.00 
NCC 
Aktiebolag 2008 30603.00 34069.00 36247.00 29976.00 31104.00 
Stora Enso AB, 
MEURO 2008 17440.30 15310.80 12240.80 11593.20 13036.70 
Swedish Match 
AB 2004 15447.00 15102.00 14621.00 16806.00 15770.00 
Tele2 AB 2004 46872.00 47970.00 47826.00 68283.00 66164.00 
TeliaSonera 
Aktiebolag 2004 206656.00 190060.00 193018.00 203775.00 199392.00 
Tieto Sweden 
AB 2006 1402.25 1575.45 1264.60 1331.90 2547.41 
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Trelleborg AB 2004 15400,00 22856.00 21799.00 24960.00 27557.00 
Wallenstam AB 2006 14481,90 17330.20 19764.00 19747.00 20249.00 
 
Appendix 4: Correlation 
Appendix 4 shows the average value of two years before the change of auditors in 
absolute numbers in MSEK, if not other specified, of Total Assets, 𝑇𝐴, Audit Fee, 𝐹 
and Company Turnover, 𝑇. These numbers were used when calculating the 
correlation coefficient.  
 
Small Cap 𝑻𝑨 𝑭 𝑻 
ACAP Invest AB 560.73 1.15 487.89 
Addnode Group Aktiebolag 51.46 0.63 172.06 
Anoto Group AB 570.76 0.35 138.75 
CYBERCOM GROUP AB 898.57 1.61 845.08 
DORO AB 225.85 1.30 527.25 
Duroc Aktiebolag 260.93 0.80 217.66 
Duroc Aktiebolag 201.03 0.51 198.08 
Elanders AB 1932.68 1.90 2011.90 
Fingerprint Cards AB 117.34 0.22 3.23 
Image Systems AB 95.36 0.41 74.61 
Image Systems AB 57.46 0.25 44.90 
Micronic Mydata AB 1721.31 1.44 1057.62 
Midway Holding 
Aktiebolag 1167.70 2.70 2015.65 
NOTE AB  918.16 1.60 1742.64 
NOVOTEK Aktiebolag 113.69 0.23 172.09 
Proact IT Group AB 440.01 1.70 761.40 
PROBI Aktiebolag 110.92 0.07 18.29 
ProfilGruppen AB 611.60 0.80 1006.80 
Semcon Aktiebolag 666.32 2.61 1554.92 
Stockwik Förvaltning AB 256.89 1.22 345.87 
Vitrolife AB 241.20 0.50 145.69 
    Mid Cap 𝑻𝑨 𝑭 𝑻 
Avanza Bank Holding AB 6613.00 0.79 443.50 
Betsson AB 718.08 0.64 520.23 
Eniro AB 7240.50 4.50 4819.00 
Fastighets AB Balder 7764.05 1.10 655.45 
Fenix Outdoor AB 440.61 0.73 597.85 
G & L Beijer AB 1156.89 1.51 1687.30 
Gunnebo Aktiebolag 4762.25 10.50 6875.80 
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Haldex Aktiebolag 4031.00 5.50 6319.50 
Heba Fastighets Aktiebolag 2619.93 0.27 198.18 
Höganäs AB  4306.50 1.60 3247.00 
Intrum Justitia AB 3708.95 6.85 2819.75 
JM AB 9886.50 4.10 8329.50 
Net Entertainment NE AB 77.33 0.21 115.31 
Nobia AB 8771.00 9.50 14016.00 
Nolato Aktiebolag 1821.00 1.97 2561.50 
Nordnet AB 1625.60 2.02 214.37 
Proffice Aktiebolag 1056.50 2.00 2636.00 
SkiStar Aktiebolag 1707.44 1.31 922.57 
TradeDoubler AB  1894.14 4.05 3060.17 
ÅF AB 1184.31 1.90 1937.34 
ÅF AB 1760.18 3.11 2691.25 
    Large Cap 𝑻𝑨 𝑭 𝑻 
Aktiebolaget Electrolux 90868.00 29.50 130148.00 
Aktiebolaget SKF 35670.00 24.00 43101.50 
Atlas Copco Aktiebolag 71634.00 55.50 68969.50 
BillerudKorsnäs Aktiebolag 9111.50 2.50 7775.00 
Boliden AB 28741.50 6.00 32095.50 
Getinge AB 19423.50 13.00 14723.00 
NCC Aktiebolag 32336.00 13.00 57136.50 
Stora Enso AB, MEURO  16375.55 6.85 13983.75 
Swedish Match AB 15274.50 13.50 13339.50 
Tele2 AB 47421.00 17.00 34096.50 
TeliaSonera Aktiebolag 198358.00 40.50 70954.00 
Tieto Sweden AB 1488.85 3.95 425.16 
Trelleborg AB 19128.00 16.00 17795.00 
Wallenstam AB 15906.05 1.00 1164.95 
Appendix 5: Audit fee ratio 
Appendix 5 shows the ratio between Audit Fees and Company Turnover of each 
company the year of the change as well as two years before and after.  
 
Small Cap 𝑹!𝟐 𝑹!𝟏 𝑹 𝑹!𝟏 𝑹!𝟐 
ACAP Invest AB 0.0026 0.0021 0.0017 0.0019 0.0022 
Addnode Group 
Aktiebolag 0.0034 0.0069 0.0041 0.0036 0.0022 
Anoto Group AB 0.0029 0.0022 0.0019 0.0015 0.0015 
CYBERCOM GROUP 
AB 0.0022 0.0017 0.0016 0.0012 0.0015 
DORO AB 0.0024 0.0025 0.0032 0.0014 0.0025 
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Duroc Aktiebolag 0.0033 0.0040 0.0025 0.0024 0.0026 
Duroc Aktiebolag 0.0024 0.0027 0.0024 0.0015 0.0017 
Elanders AB 0.0008 0.0010 0.0010 0.0014 0.0012 
Fingerprint Cards AB 0.1239 0.0410 0.0145 0.0335 0.0351 
Image Systems AB 0.0054 0.0055 0.0032 0.0028 0.0071 
Image Systems AB 0.0071 0.0048 0.0050 0.0053 0.0085 
Micronic Mydata AB 0.0016 0.0012 0.0011 0.0018 0.0020 
Midway Holding 
Aktiebolag 0.0013 0.0013 0.0006 0.0008 0.0010 
NOTE AB  0.0009 0.0009 0.0006 0.0010 0.0009 
NOVOTEK Aktiebolag 0.0017 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0010 
Proact IT Group AB 0.0022 0.0022 0.0011 0.0011 0.0016 
PROBI Aktiebolag 0.0038 0.0041 0.0045 0.0082 0.0079 
ProfilGruppen AB 0.0009 0.0007 0.0005 0.0006 0.0009 
Semcon Aktiebolag 0.0016 0.0017 0.0009 0.0008 0.0011 
Stockwik Förvaltning 
AB 0.0025 0.0078 0.0015 0.0035 0.0038 
Vitrolife AB 0.0038 0.0031 0.0021 0.0018 0.0017 
      Mid Cap 𝑹!𝟐 𝑹!𝟏 𝑹 𝑹!𝟏 𝑹!𝟐 
Avanza Bank Holding 
AB 0.0017 0.0018 0.0012 0.0019 0.0017 
Betsson AB 0.0022 0.0007 0.0020 0.0013 0.0007 
Eniro AB 0.0011 0.0008 0.0008 0.0010 0.0009 
Fastighets AB Balder 0.0016 0.0017 0.0014 0.0009 0.0010 
Fenix Outdoor AB 0.0013 0.0011 0.0005 0.0013 0.0017 
G & L Beijer AB 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 
Gunnebo Aktiebolag 0.0016 0.0015 0.0011 0.0013 0.0012 
Haldex Aktiebolag 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 
Heba Fastighets 
Aktiebolag 0.0014 0.0013 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 
Höganäs AB  0.0007 0.0003 0.0007 0.0011 0.0009 
Intrum Justitia AB 0.0017 0.0031 0.0029 0.0042 0.0029 
JM AB 0.0004 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003 
Net Entertainment NE 
AB 0.0016 0.0019 0.0025 0.0024 0.0025 
Nobia AB 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 
Nolato Aktiebolag 0.0006 0.0009 0.0006 0.0008 0.0006 
Nordnet AB 0.0117 0.0075 0.0045 0.0043 0.0026 
Proffice Aktiebolag 0.0008 0.0007 0.0005 0.0007 0.0010 
SkiStar Aktiebolag 0.0013 0.0015 0.0006 0.0009 0.0008 
TradeDoubler AB  0.0011 0.0015 0.0016 0.0024 0.0017 
ÅF AB 0.0009 0.0010 0.0008 0.0010 0.0012 
ÅF AB 0.0012 0.0011 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 
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Large Cap 𝑹!𝟐 𝑹!𝟏 𝑹 𝑹!𝟏 𝑹!𝟐 
Aktiebolaget Electrolux 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 
Aktiebolaget SKF 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0009 0.0006 
Atlas Copco Aktiebolag 0.0007 0.0009 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 
BillerudKorsnäs 
Aktiebolag 0.0003 0.0004 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
Boliden AB 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
Getinge AB 0.0008 0.0010 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 
NCC Aktiebolag 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
Stora Enso AB  0.0004 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 
Swedish Match AB 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 0.0020 
Tele2 AB 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 
TeliaSonera Aktiebolag 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0009 
Tieto Sweden AB 0.0103 0.0084 0.0047 0.0047 0.0004 
Trelleborg AB 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010 0.0011 0.0011 
Wallenstam AB 0.0009 0.0008 0.0010 0.0011 0.0015 
Appendix 6: Changes in Audit fee ratios 
Appendix 6 shows the estimated normal audit fee, 𝑅, and the initial change in audit 
fee ratio the year of the switch as well as the two following years.  	  
Small Cap 𝑹 Audit Fee percentage change, 𝒕 Audit Fee percentage change, 𝒕!𝟏 Audit Fee percentage change, 𝒕!𝟐 
ACAP Invest AB 0.0024 -0.2903 -0.1926 -0.0588 
Addnode Group 
Aktiebolag 0.0051 -0.1943 -0.3040 -0.5744 
Anoto Group AB 0.0026 -0.2495 -0.4212 -0.4188 
CYBERCOM 
GROUP AB 0.0020 -0.2138 -0.4105 -0.2708 
DORO AB 0.0025 0.2825 -0.4255 -0.0080 
Duroc Aktiebolag 0.0037 -0.3157 -0.3461 -0.2885 
Duroc Aktiebolag 0.0026 -0.0719 -0.4187 -0.3285 
Elanders AB 0.0009 0.0476 0.4809 0.2513 
Fingerprint Cards 
AB 0.0825 -0.8243 -0.5935 -0.5748 
Image Systems AB 0.0054 -0.4191 -0.4826 0.3118 
Image Systems AB 0.0060 -0.1676 -0.1175 0.4168 
Micronic Mydata 
AB 0.0014 -0.2154 0.3063 0.4002 
Midway Holding 
Aktiebolag 0.0013 -0.5313 -0.3984 -0.2685 
NOTE AB  0.0009 -0.3977 0.1257 -0.0101 
NOVOTEK 0.0014 -0.2087 -0.1587 -0.2664 
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Aktiebolag 
Proact IT Group A 0.0022 -0.5229 -0.5153 -0.2835 
PROBI Aktiebolag 0.0039 0.1415 1.0790 1.0025 
ProfilGruppen AB 0.0008 -0.3638 -0.1940 0.1453 
Semcon Aktiebolag 0.0017 -0.4507 -0.5118 -0.3725 
Stockwik 
Förvaltning AB 0.0051 -0.7086 -0.3252 -0.2564 
Vitrolife AB 0.0035 -0.3986 -0.4953 -0.5001 
     
Mid Cap 𝑹 Audit Fee percentage change, 𝒕 Audit Fee percentage change, 𝒕!𝟏 Audit Fee percentage change, 𝒕!𝟐 
Avanza Bank 
Holding AB 0.0018 -0.3075 0.0616 -0.0241 
Betsson AB 0.0014 0.4295 -0.0953 -0.4977 
Eniro AB 0.0009 -0.1309 0.1069 -0.0427 
Fastighets AB 
Balder 0.0017 -0.1637 -0.4642 -0.4317 
Fenix Outdoor AB 0.0012 -0.5612 0.0767 0.3769 
G & L Beijer AB 0.0009 -0.0473 -0.0432 -0.0915 
Gunnebo 
Aktiebolag 0.0015 -0.2988 -0.1520 -0.2179 
Haldex Aktiebolag 0.0009 -0.0471 0.0211 0.0756 
Heba Fastighets 
Aktiebolag 0.0013 0.3080 0.3151 0.3309 
Höganäs AB  0.0005 0.4067 1.1449 0.8107 
Intrum Justitia AB 0.0024 0.2050 0.7287 0.1819 
JM AB 0.0005 -0.0950 -0.1893 -0.3356 
Net Entertainment 
NE AB 0.0018 0.3924 0.3552 0.3928 
Nobia AB 0.0007 -0.1184 0.0080 0.1406 
Nolato Aktiebolag 0.0008 -0.2340 0.0166 -0.2365 
Nordnet AB 0.0096 -0.5275 -0.5502 -0.7252 
Proffice Aktiebolag 0.0008 -0.3093 -0.0793 0.3397 
SkiStar Aktiebolag 0.0014 -0.5618 -0.3684 -0.4672 
TradeDoubler AB  0.0013 0.2160 0.8454 0.3208 
ÅF AB 0.0010 -0.1793 0.0551 0.2271 
ÅF AB 0.0012 -0.4765 -0.4020 -0.3467 
     
Large Cap 𝑹 Audit Fee percentage change, 𝒕 Audit Fee percentage change, 𝒕!𝟏 Audit Fee percentage change, 𝒕!𝟐 
Aktiebolaget 
Electrolux 0.0002 0.2595 0.6006 0.6826 
Aktiebolaget SKF 0.0006 -0.0905 0.5532 0.0104 
Atlas Copco 0.0008 -0.2246 -0.2721 -0.3063 
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Aktiebolag 
BillerudKorsnäs 
Aktiebolag 0,0003 -0.5991 -0.2951 -0.3340 
Boliden AB 0.0002 -0.0333 -0.1106 -0.3375 
Getinge AB 0.0009 -0.2256 -0.1446 -0.0680 
NCC Aktiebolag 0.0002 -0.0045 0.1786 0.3356 
Stora Enso AB  0.0005 -0.0990 -0.0705 0.0042 
Swedish Match AB 0.0010 -0.0121 0.0396 0.9905 
Tele2 AB 0.0005 -0.3056 -0.1624 0.1879 
TeliaSonera 
Aktiebolag 0.0006 -0.1014 0.0038 0.6171 
Tieto Sweden AB 0.0094 -0.4970 -0.4921 -0.9546 
Trelleborg AB 0.0009 0.0678 0.2299 0.2338 
Wallenstam AB 0.0009 0.2196 0.3113 0.7668 
                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
